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This paper develops a two-period labor market model with imperfect information and on-the-
job training, and uses data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohorts 
(NLSY79) to test its predictions. We find that training does not explain the positive 
relationship between employer size and wage. In addition, for industries that display size-
wage premium, workers in large establishments are more likely to receive on-the-job training 
but their return to training is smaller. Our theory, substantiated by the new empirical 
evidence, suggests that it is not large firms, per se, but firms that hire better workers who are 
paying a wage premium. 
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Employer size-wage premium is a well-known puzzle in labor economics.1 It is
perplexing that larger ﬁrms pay observationally equivalent workers higher wages
than their smaller counterparts, which seems to violate the law of one price. Our
inability to explain the size-wage relationship suggests that something important is
missing in the understanding of labor market.
Recently, several new hypotheses have been proposed to explain the positive re-
lationship between employer size and wage. These include the training hypotheses
(e.g., Troske 1999, Zabojnik and Bernhardt 2001 and Oi and Idson 1999), on-the-
job search model (e.g., Burdett and Mortensen 1998), and the imperfect information
model (Feng and Zheng 2009). All of these theories generate positive size-wage rela-
tionship. Therefore, to examine their respective explanatory powers, it is necessary
to explore additional empirically testable implications.
To do so, this paper ﬁrst develops a two-period labor market model incorporat-
ing both employer learning in an environment of imperfect information and workers’
human capital accumulation on the job. While the static model of Feng and Zheng
(2009) generates both size-wage premium and (imperfect) positive sorting of worker
type with ﬁrm size, to subject the idea of imperfect information to strict empirical
scrutiny, a dynamic version of the model is called for. Over time, one may expect
the size-wage premium to decline as information is gradually revealed. But due to
training and other forms of human capital accumulations, heterogeneities in produc-
tivity among individual workers may increase, resulting larger size-wage premium.
An empirically tractable model thus has to include both elements.
In the two-period model developed here, the ﬁrst period is similar to the one-period
model of Feng and Zheng (2009). The competitive labor market consists of heteroge-
neous workers and ex ante identical ﬁrms with only partial knowledge of worker
type. The model has two types of equilibra, those that display positive size wage re-
lationship and those that do not. In any equilibrium, ﬁrms posting higher wages hire
1See e.g., Brown and Medoff (1989) and our literature review in Section 2.
2workers who are more productive on average. As ﬁrms do not know worker’s true
type for sure, workers of the same productivity are paid differently if they are hired
by different ﬁrms. Thus there exists wage dispersion conditional on worker type.
In the second period, incumbent ﬁrms evaluate worker’s performance in the ﬁrst
period, and update beliefs about worker productivity. They then provide ﬁrm-speciﬁc
training to workers they think are of high ability, but provide no training to those
they believe are of low ability. All workers are paid according to their expected pre-
training productivity. In equilibria that display positive size-wage premium, large
ﬁrms train a higher proportion of workers, but the size-wage differential for trained
workers is also smaller than that for untrained workers, i.e., return to training is
smaller in large ﬁrms. In contrast, in equilibria that do not display positive size wage
premium, neither of the two predictions holds.
We next conduct empirical analyses using data from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth 1979 Cohorts (NLSY79), which contains extensive training informa-
tion. As a preliminary test we examine the existence of size-wage premium for each
industry individually. The preliminary analysis shows that the size-wage relation-
ship is not uniform. Without controlling for unobserved personal heterogeneities, we
ﬁnd that some industries do not display positive size-wage relationship, and a few
even have a negative relationship. Consistent with the theoretical model, for indus-
tries that do not display positive size-wage premium, there is no evidence of positive
sorting between ﬁrm size and worker characteristics such as education and Armed
Force Qualiﬁcation Test (AFQT) score.
The main test focuses on industries that do display signiﬁcant positive size-wage
premium. It shows that differences in training cannot explain the existence of size-
wage premium. In addition, return to training is lower in large establishments than
in small establishments. With our preferred ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that
return to training is lower by 7.5% in establishments with at least 500 employees
than in smaller ones.2 The probability of receiving training is also higher in large
2We have also used 250 and 100 as the cutoff points for large establishments, as well as natural log
3establishments. These ﬁndings are consistent with the theoretical predictions.
As a falsiﬁcation test, we also examine industries that do not show positive size-
wage premium. After controlling for training and its interaction term with ﬁrm size,
we ﬁnd no evidence that return to training is smaller in large establishments. With
control on unobserved person effect, the probability of receiving training is not higher
in large establishments either. Our falsiﬁcation test therefore indicates a link be-
tween lower return to training in large establishments and the existence of size-wage
premium and sorting.
To summarize, our theory, as well as the empirical evidence suggests that it is not
large ﬁrms per se, but ﬁrms hiring better workers who are paying a wage premium.
We believe the same intuition sheds light on other forms of wage dispersion, such
as inter-industry wage differential (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988) and exporter-
wage premium (e.g., Bernard and Jensen 1995, 1997). The model we have here can
be easily extended to show that high productivity industries or exporters offer higher
wages to attract more productive workers, but also hire some less productive workers
due to imperfect knowledge of worker types. This generates both wage dispersion and
sorting of workers across different industries, or between exporting and non-exporting
ﬁrms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literatures.
Section 3 presents the theoretical model. Section 4 examines empirical evidence from
the NLSY79 data. The relevance of our new empirical ﬁndings to alternative theories
is examined in section 5. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A collects proofs of the main
results. Appendix B presents results of the falsiﬁcation test.
of establishment size as a continuous measure. Results are robust to these alternative speciﬁcations.
42 Literature Review
2.1 Employer Size-Wage Effect
Moore (1911) ﬁrst documented wage gains associated with working in large ﬁrms
or establishments using data from Italian textile mills. Similar ﬁndings were subse-
quently reported for U.S. (see Lester 1967, Mellow 1982, Personick and Barsky 1982,
Brown, Hamilton and Medoff 1990, Idson and Feaster 1990), the European countries
(see Main and Reilly 1993, Abowd et al. 1999), and also for developing countries
(see Velenchik 1997, Schaffner 1998, and S¨ oderbom et al. 2005). The magnitude of
size-wage premium is substantial. To put it into perspective, we quote Brown and
Medoff (1989), “if a typical worker went from an establishment with employment one
standard deviation below average to an establishment with employment one standard
deviation above average, the employee would enjoy a wage increase of 8-12 percent,
about as large as the union-nonunion differential in these data.”
Many explanations have been advanced to rationalize the positive size-wage rela-
tionship within the perfect competition framework. Brown and Medoff (1989) have
empirically examined six potential explanations, but only found modest support for
the worker heterogeneity hypothesis. The ﬁve other explanations considered are:
large ﬁrms offer inferior working conditions; large ﬁrms make greater use of high
wages to forestall unionization; large ﬁrms have stronger ability to pay high wages;
large ﬁrms face smaller pools of applicants relative to vacancies; large ﬁrms are less
able to monitor their workers. In their conclusion, Brown and Medoff (1989) also
hypothesize that the employer size-wage relationship may actually be a relationship
between ﬁrm age and wage since large ﬁrms are usually old ﬁrms. However, sub-
sequently Brown and Medoff (2003) have showed the ﬁrm age-wage relationship is
explained by observed worker characteristics (see also Appendix A of Oi and Idson
1999).
Recently, some researchers have suggested size-wage premium is a result of pro-
ductivity differences between workers in large ﬁrms and small ones that have not
5been adequately controlled for in previous studies. Troske (1999) argues that both
large employers and their employees are more likely to invest in ﬁrm-speciﬁc human
capital. Thus, workers in large ﬁrms or establishments are paid more because they
receive more ﬁrm-speciﬁc training. Similarly, Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) have
showed corporate tournaments can induce workers in large ﬁrms to accumulate more
general human capital through training. The productivity hypothesis in Oi and Id-
son (1999) is similar in spirit - workers in large ﬁrms are more productive because
the production processes are organized differently in large and small ﬁrms. As pro-
ductivity differences associated with size are endogenously determined, ﬁxed effect
approach is not adequate for resolving the issue.3 Rather, it is necessary to control for
these differences, such as training workers received, with suitable data sets. Because
of data limitation, this has not been done in previous studies.
Another prominent explanation of size-wage premium is the on-the-job search
model of Burdett and Moretensen (1998). According to them, workers do not fully
know potential jobs, thus have to either wait for a time period or incur a direct cost
to sample from the pool of job offers. Workers search randomly and gradually move
from low paying jobs to high paying jobs. In equilibrium, identical ﬁrms offer differ-
ent wages. Those offering higher wages attract more workers but at the same time
realize lower per worker proﬁt.
2.2 Return to On-the-job Training
On-the-job training is considered as one of the most important channels through
which workers accumulate human capital. Becker (1964) makes the critical distinc-
tion between general training and ﬁrm-speciﬁc training. General training increases
workers’ productivity in all ﬁrms, thus can only be ﬁnanced by workers themselves. In
contrast, ﬁrm-speciﬁc training only increases worker’s productivity at the incumbent
ﬁrm, and is ﬁnanced by workers and ﬁrms jointly.
Becker’s theory has been challenged by the empirical ﬁnding that, in many cases,
3See Gibbons and Katz (1992) for a similar argument.
6ﬁrms do pay for general training (e.g., Krueger 1993, Autor 2001). New models have
been developed explicitly incorporating labor market imperfections which compress
the wage structure and allow ﬁrms to beneﬁt from offering technically general train-
ing to their workers (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999). Therefore, the predictions on how
general and ﬁrm-speciﬁc training affect wages are less clear-cut as many general
trainings have become de facto ﬁrm-speciﬁc due to frictions in the labor market.
While economists have long been interested in knowing the magnitude of return to
training, i.e., the effect of training on wage rates, for both theoretical and policy rea-
sons, getting an estimate remains an empirical challenge. Unlike full-time schooling,
training happens after workers enter the labor market, and is difﬁcult to measure.4
Earlier empirical studies on return to training include Mincer (1983; 1988), Brown
(1983; 1989), and Lillard and Tan (1992). However, all these studies use some proxies,
not precise measure of actual training workers received. Thus, we only review later
studies based on NLSY79.5 None of the studies, however, have examined whether
returns to training differ for workers in different-sized ﬁrms or establishments.6
Lynch (1992) uses the 1979-1986 waves of NLSY79 to study the impact of training
on wages. Her ﬁnding shows that on-the-job training signiﬁcantly increases wages.
Using later waves of NLSY79, Veum (1995) has found that while the incidence of
on-the-job training is positively associated with higher wage level and wage growth,
training duration has no effect on either. Using all waves of NLSY79 data up to
2000, Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) have found training has a large effect on wages,
several times higher than the return to formal education, even after differences in
wage growth, promotion, and measurement errors have been controlled for. They
have also showed that using a single dummy for training incidence produces almost
the same ﬁt and median effect as including both training incidence and durations
4See Barron, Berger and Black, (1997) for a discussion of informal training, for example.
5Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) provide the most recent survey of empirical ﬁndings on on-the-job
training from the NLSY79.
6Bishop (1997) provided some evidence that productivity gains from training for workers in large
establishments are substantially larger than their counterparts in small establishments.
7(Frazis and Loewenstein 2005, Table 2).
3 Theoretical model
In this section, we extend the cherry picking model of Feng and Zheng (2009) to
incorporate information updating and on-the-job training. The economy consists of
inﬁnite number of ex ante identical ﬁrms, and a continuum of workers,  proportion
being of high productivity type (type “H”) and 1    being of low productivity type
(type “L”). A high type worker can produce one unit of output if employed, while a
low type worker can not produce any output.
Worker types are unknown to all parties initially, but ﬁrms and workers learn
worker type over time.7 This is similar to a large literature on asymmetric learning in
labor market, such as Waldman (1996), Gibbons and Waldman (1999), Golan (2005),
and Sch¨ onberg (2007).
Workers are risk-neutral and maximize total wages received without discount-
ing the second period wage. There is no cost associated with job application on the
worker’s side and with hiring/ﬁring on the ﬁrm’s side. As we do not allow for long term
contracts, in each period, workers work for the ﬁrm that offers the highest wage, pro-
vided the highest wage is greater than their reservation wage r(t), where r(t) 2 (0;).
For simplicity, let r(t) = r for t = 1;2, i.e., they have the same reservation wage in
both periods.
3.1 The ﬁrst period
At the beginning of the ﬁrst period, workers apply to all ﬁrms. While not knowing
a worker’s type for sure, each ﬁrm makes a private assessment on job applicants,
7Allowing workers to know their own types does not change our main results, but will make the
analysis much more complicated.
8labeling a job applicant as either “h” or “l” type.8 A high type worker will be labeled
as “h” type with probability H and as “l” type with probability 1   H. A low type
worker will be labeled as “l” type with probability L and as “h” type with probability
1 L. Private assessments by different ﬁrms are independent, thus a worker labeled
as “l” type by one ﬁrm may be taken as “h” type by another. For simplicity we let
H = L = , where  2 (1=2;1).
The hiring process is sequential, consisting of many rounds of auctions in which
ﬁrms compete for the right to make offers. Each round, ﬁrms that have not hired post
wages they are willing to offer to some workers in the remaining pool of applicants.
The one with the highest wage wins the right to hire. In case several ﬁrms tie at
the highest wage, one ﬁrm is randomly chosen as the winner. The winning ﬁrm then
makes job offers to a positive measure of workers in the remaining pool at its posted
wage. Workers who receive an offer then decide whether to accept it. After that the
game moves on to the next round with the same process repeated for ﬁrms who have
not hired and for workers who have not accepted any offer. Job market closes when
no remaining ﬁrms ﬁnds it proﬁtable to post a wage that will be accepted. Production
then begins and ﬁrms realize their ﬁrst period proﬁt.
3.2 The second period
At the beginning of the second period, incumbent ﬁrms privately evaluate worker’s
performance in the ﬁrst period. Because of observational errors, the performance
measure will not perfectly reﬂect a worker’s true performance. Conditional on a
worker being of high type and thus performs well, an incumbent ﬁrm has a good eval-
uation about his performance, denoted as “g” with probability H, and has a bad evalu-
ation, denoted as “b” with probability 1 H. Conditional on a worker being of low type
and thus does not perform, the incumbent ﬁrm has a “g” evaluation with probability
1 L and “b” with probability L. For simplicity we assume that H = L =  2 (1=2;1).
8For example, ﬁrms may gain some information on job applicants from their job application mate-
rials and interviews.
9Given the performance evaluations, the incumbent ﬁrm then updates its belief
about worker types using Bayes rule. Thus, if ﬁrm k’s prior belief of a worker being
of high type is Hk, its posterior belief b





Hk(1   ) + (1   Hk)
< Hk; (1)
and its posterior belief 
g





Hk + (1   Hk)(1   )
> Hk: (2)
With this information, the incumbent ﬁrm makes wage offers to current employees
and provide ﬁrm-speciﬁc training to selected workers. Training increases high type
worker’s productivity but not the low type’s. After training, a high type worker can
produce q > 1 unit of output, instead of one without training. A low type worker’s
output will be zero irrespective of his training status.9 Training is ﬁrm-speciﬁc and
thus, training received at one ﬁrm does not increase worker’s output at another.10 It
is also costly: ﬁrms incur a cost of c to train one worker. Clearly, if the per worker
training cost is too high, for example, c > q   1, it would not be proﬁtable to train any
worker. On the other hand, if it is too low, for example, c = 0, it would be proﬁtable to




 + (1   )(1   )(1   )[=(1   )] 1 > c >
(1   )(q   1)
(1   ) + (1   )(1   )
:
9The assumption that training and worker ability are complements is a standard one in the litera-
ture, see e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke (1998).
10It is true that many training programs are general in the sense that skills taught are also useful
in other ﬁrms. However, as noted in Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), in a non-competitive environment,
labor market imperfections turn general skills into de facto speciﬁc skills. One can thus assume general
training but incorporate some additional labor market frictions, such as matching and search, in the
model to get similar results as we have here. Alternatively, Lazear (2010) provides a skill-weights
interpretation to ﬁrm speciﬁc human capital.
10That is, there are at least  > 0 number of ﬁrms who would ﬁnd it proﬁtable to
train workers with good performance evaluations, but no ﬁrm ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
train those with bad evaluations.
Outside ﬁrms have no direct contact with workers not currently working with
them, and gain no extra information about those workers. Learning is asymmetric
here, as in many previous studies, for example, Sch¨ onberg (2007) and Golan (2005,
2006).11 The only difference is that learning is imperfect for the incumbent ﬁrm in
our model, while it is perfect in theirs. Of course, if ﬁrms and worker are to interact
for many periods, incumbent ﬁrms’ belief may gradually converge to their true types,
which corresponds to a special case of  = 1.
On the other hand, outside ﬁrms observe a worker’s training status and wage offer
from the incumbent ﬁrm in the second period, as well as the identity of ﬁrms (hence
the average productivities of their workers) they are afﬁliated with.12 Based on this
information, outside ﬁrms can also make an offer to them. Workers choose the ﬁrm
that offers the highest wage, and stay with the current employer if its offer ties with
the highest outside offer. Production then starts, and ﬁrms realize their proﬁts. After
that, the game ends with all workers exiting the labor market.
3.3 Main results
Like the one period model of Feng and Zheng (2009), the two-period model has
multiple equilibria. While wage dispersion is a distinct feature of all equilibria, not
all exhibit positive size-wage differential. This is so as in any equilibrium, ﬁrms
expect zero proﬁt from each hire and can hire any portion of workers they think are
of high type. In some equilibria, a ﬁrm that hires earlier (paying higher wages) will
have a smaller workforce than one that hires later (paying lower wages). As our main
11Alternatively, assuming outside ﬁrms gain the same information as incumbent ﬁrms, i.e., there is
symmetric learning, does not change our results. This is because in our setup incumbent ﬁrms move
ﬁrst and are not allowed to make counter offers.
12We assume ﬁrms have short memory and do not remember the ﬁrst-period assessments they may
have on workers who have applied to but were not hired by them.
11concern is the size wage premium puzzle, we will focus on equilibria that exhibit
positive size-wage relationship. We therefore make the following assumption:
Assumption 2. Firms treat observationally identical workers the same way.
This assumption requires a ﬁrm to make the same offer to all workers who are
observationally equivalent, i.e., those with the same expected productivity from the
ﬁrm’s perspective. This helps to eliminate the type of equilibria in which ﬁrms of-
fering higher wages may hire a small portion of workers they think are of high type
while those offering lower wages hire a large proportion.
Proposition 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, there exists equilibrium that has the
following properties:
1. In the ﬁrst period, different ﬁrms pay different wages, with ﬁrms paying higher
wages hiring more workers.
2. In the second period, only workers with a good performance evaluation receive
ﬁrm-speciﬁc training.
3. Trained workers receive higher wages than untrained workers in the same ﬁrm.
4. Controlling for training status, large ﬁrms still pay more to workers than small
ﬁrms.
In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrms make two choices at the time of hiring: to post a wage,
and decide whom to hire after winning the right to hire. They face two observation-
ally different groups of workers: those labeled as “h” type and those labeled as “l”
type. Because of competition between ex ante identical ﬁrms, in equilibrium, winning
wage in any round is equal to the sum of average productivity of “h” type workers
and expected second-period per worker proﬁt from those workers. Consequently, only
workers labeled as “h” type will be hired. Under Assumption 2, each ﬁrm hires every
worker labeled as “h” type. In this case, the average productivity of workers at ﬁrm k
12who hires in the k-th round is:
Hk =
(1   )k 1
(1   )k 1 + (1   )k 1(1   )
: (3)
The total measure of workers at ﬁrm k equals Nk = (1   )k 1 + (1   )k 1(1   ).
Since both Hk and Nk are decreasing in k, there is a positive relationship between
ﬁrm size and wage.
Because training is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, ﬁrms will get all the surplus 2
k from training.




k=Nk  0 is ﬁrm k’s expected per worker proﬁt from the second period.
As more and more ﬁrms have hired, the proportion of high type workers in the re-
maining pool decreases, so does the measure of unemployed workers. At certain point,
it becomes unproﬁtable for another ﬁrm to hire, as the expected beneﬁt from hiring
a worker the ﬁrm labels as “h” type falls below the reservation wage r. This implies
that in equilibrium, the number of hiring ﬁrms K is determined by the condition:
HK + 
2
K  r > HK+1 + 
2
K+1: (4)
While incumbent ﬁrm has an informational advantage over outside ﬁrms, this
does not translate into any monopsony power. This is so as outside ﬁrms know the
average productivity of the incumbent’s labor force, and can make offers after observ-
ing the its offer. Should the incumbent ﬁrm’s wage offers are on average less than the
expected pre-training productivity, outside ﬁrms can proﬁtably outbid the incumbent
and attract its workers away. In this sense, outside ﬁrms have a strategical advan-
tage over the incumbent ﬁrm even though the latter has an informational advantage.
This helps level the playing ﬁeld for the two sides and results in zero pre-training
proﬁt for the incumbent ﬁrm in the second period.13
As incumbent ﬁrms pay workers according to their expected pre-training produc-
tivities, and training is ﬁrm-speciﬁc, it is proﬁtable to train a worker as long as the
13Of course, this result holds only if the incumbent ﬁrm can not make any counter offers. When the
incumbent can make counter offers, as in Golan (2005) and Baron et al. (2006), this will not be the
case.
13expected increase in productivity more than offsets the training cost. In equilibria
with positive size-wage differential, large ﬁrms have a higher proportion of produc-
tive workers; they therefore also train more of their workers.
Corollary 1. The proportion of trained workers increases in ﬁrm size Nk and decreases
in k.
Note that ﬁrm size, Nk and the average quality of workers, Hk, both decrease in k.
But the proportion of trained workers at ﬁrm k, Hk + (1   )(1   HK), is increasing
in Hk and thus decreasing in k. Hence, the proportion of trained workers is higher in
larger ﬁrms than in smaller ﬁrms.
Corollary 2. Log wage differential is smaller for trained workers than for untrained
workers, i.e., return to training is smaller in large ﬁrms.
This result says that even though trained workers at a larger ﬁrm get higher pay
than their smaller ﬁrm counterparts, the log wage differential is smaller for trained
workers than for untrained workers. Empirically this would imply a lower return to
training for workers at larger ﬁrms. The intuition for this result is as follows. Initially
ﬁrms pay workers the average productivity of all workers. Because of cherry-picking,
the average productivity at larger ﬁrms is higher than that at smaller ﬁrms. In the
second period, as ﬁrms learn more about their workers, they update beliefs about
worker productivity and adjust wages accordingly. This results in a decline of wage
differentials associated with employer size for those workers viewed as high type. The
declined wage differential for trained workers reﬂects learning by employers who only
have imperfect knowledge of workers’ productivity at the time of hiring.
REMARK: Note that without assumption 2, there exist equilibria that do not exhibit
size-wage premium, as ﬁrms can hire any proportion of workers labeled as “h” type. In
those equilibria, neither implications, corollary 1 and corollary 2 may hold.
For example, let ﬁrm i and j hires in the k-th and (k + 1)-th round, respectively.
Clearly wi > wj. If ﬁrm i hires only a very small portion of workers labeled as “h”,
14while ﬁrm j hires all labeled as “h”, then it is possible that the measure of workers
hired by ﬁrm i (Ni) is smaller than that of ﬁrm j (Nj). In this case, there is a negative
relationship between employer size and wage. Also, the proportion of trained workers
for ﬁrm i will be larger than in ﬁrm j, as the proportion of trainable (high type)
workers is larger in ﬁrm i. Similarly, return to training is lower in ﬁrm i, which is
now the smaller ﬁrm. Therefore, neither predictions holds when size-wage premium
does not exist.
These predictions suggest that we can compare industries that do display size-
wage premium with those that do not. If our explanation of the size-wage differential
is correct, we would expect to observe the patterns stated in the two corollaries to
appear only in industries that display size-wage premium, but not those that do not.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Data
To test the predictions of the theoretical model, we conduct empirical analyses us-
ing data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 Cohorts (NLSY79). Re-
spondents in NLSY79 were interviewed annually from 1979 to 1994, and biannually
since 1994. NLSY79 includes a nationally representative cross-sectional sample, a
supplemental sample, and a military sample. In this paper, we restrict our analyses
to the cross-sectional sample, and focus on the period 1986-2000, as there were no es-
tablishment size information for the period of 1981-1985, and some survey questions
were restructured after 2000. To get a relatively homogeneous group of individuals,
we consider only white males working full time (deﬁned as 35 hours work per week
and above) at nonunion jobs. Self-employed individuals are also excluded.
NLSY79 provides detailed training information. Like previous studies (e.g., Frazis
and Loewenstein 2005), we focus on completed on-the-job training spells,14 and use
14A training spell is deﬁned as on-the-job if it is “company training (type=8)” during the 1979-1986
surveys, “formal company training run by employer (type=8)” or “training programs at work not run
15a training dummy (training incidence) rather than actual training hours in order to
be consistent with the theoretical model. However, our results remain unchanged if
actual training hours are also included.15
We use establishment size information, taken from the question “number of em-
ployees at location of current job” or “number of employees at location at respondent’s
job number 1”. Firm sizes were not available from the survey,16 but previous studies
have shown that ﬁrm size and establishment size are highly correlated (Brown and
Medoff, 1989). We follow the literature and use 500 employees as the cutoff point to
deﬁne establishments as either large or small. Nevertheless, none of our qualitative
conclusions changes when alternative cutoff points (250 and 100) or the natural log
of establishment size are used.17
The analysis uses current job (or CPS job, job number 1) information for the pe-
riod 1986-2000. We ﬁrst transform nominal hourly wages into real wages using CPI-U
(1982-1984=100), then exclude values that are greater than $100 or less than $1. In
most years the loss of sample size is less than 2%. For each sample, the following
information is recorded: year of tenure, total labor market experience, union status
on the job, industry, occupation, part-time status, establishment size, local unemploy-
ment rate, on-the-job training incidence and hours, and off-the-job training incidence
and hours. Variables such as education, marriage status, and AFQT score are also
included.
by employer (type=9)” during the 1988-2000 surveys. The 1987 wave of NLSY79 does not contain any
training questions. Instead, training happened in 1987 were recorded in the 1988 survey.
15Veum (1995) and Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) all ﬁnd that when training incidence is controlled
for, hours of training is no longer statistically signiﬁcant.
16For workplaces within the ﬁrm, but other than where the employee is working from, NLSY79 only
asked for whether the number of employees is above 1,000.
17These results are available upon request.
164.2 Preliminary analyses
As a ﬁrst step, we use the NLSY79 data to reproduce the size-wage effect docu-
mented in the literature, without controlling for training status. To do so, we run
OLS regressions on large establishment size dummy (500+) and other control vari-
ables for each industry separately. The results, as reported in Table 1, show that
size-wage effects vary substantially by industry. For our main empirical analyses, we
only use industries that show a positive and signiﬁcant size-wage premium, including
manufacturing, transportation, communication and other public utilities, wholesale
and retail trade, business and repair services, and public administration.18 These in-
dustries account for 63% of the total sample. Other industires as reported in Panel B
of Table 1 are used in falsiﬁcation tests in Appendix B.19
There is some evidence that the existence of positive size-wage premium is closely
related to sorting among worker characteristics. Table 1 shows that most industries
in Panel A display positive sorting on college education and AFQT score, i.e., on aver-
age workers in large establishments are more likely to have at least college education
and have higher AFQT scores. In contrast, those industries shown in Panel B of Ta-
ble 1 typically display lower degrees of positive sorting. For two industries, health
services and entertainment and recreation services, there is even negative sorting on
both college education and AFQT. Not surprisingly, both industries also show nega-
tive size-wage relationship. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions: there
is neither size-wage premium nor positive sorting on worker type in equilibria in
which ﬁrms do not treat identical workers similarly.
Sample summary statistics are given in Table 2. Sample size is 9,314, with 1,644
individuals. The sample mean of the natural log of hourly wage (in cents) is 6.71,
which corresponds to a real wage rate of $8.2 in 1982-84 dollar. In terms of education,
18We do so as our focus is to explore the size-wage puzzle. Also, our theory suggests the existence of
multiple equilibria with and without positive size-wage relationship.
19Results are robust to minor changes in industry compostion, such as including mining in our main
analyses.
1756% of the sample has a high school diploma or less, while 19% has at least a Bach-
elor’s degree. On average, workers have 4.6 years of tenure with current employers
and 11.7 years of total labor market experience. 83% of the sample works in establish-
ments with less than 500 employees, while the rest works in large ones. Average wage
rate at large establishments is substantially higher. Workers at large establishments
earn 0.33 log points more than those at small establishments. In addition, workers at
large establishments tend to be more productive, with more years of schooling, higher
AFQT scores, longer tenure with current employers and more on-the-job training.
The following ordinary least squares (OLS) model controls for observable charac-
teristics that affect productivities and wages:
LNWit = L ESTit + X
0
it + "it: (5)
Here, the subscript i stands for worker and t for year. The dependent variable LNW
is the log hourly wage, L EST is a dummy for large establishment, and X is the
vector of other explanatory variables, including AFQT, schooling dummies, marriage
dummies, regional dummies, local unemployment rate, tenure with current job, total
labor market experience, and industry dummies.
We also use a panel data model with additional control on unobserved person ef-
fects,
LNWit = L ESTit + X
0
it + i + "it: (6)
Here  is the unobserved person effects (indexed by i) that do not change for a given
worker. The model is estimated using both random effects and ﬁxed effects ap-
proaches.
Table 3 reports estimated coefﬁcients as well as robust standard errors clustered
at the person level. We see that as usual, more schooling is associated with higher
earnings. AFQT, tenure and labor market experience are all positively related to
hourly wage rate, while workers in areas of high unemployment are paid less. Based
on the OLS result, workers in large establishments earn 13.3% more than those in
small ones. When person effects are controlled, the estimated coefﬁcient is reduced to
187.2% in the random effects speciﬁcation, and to 5.4% in the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation.
Nevertheless, they are all statistically signiﬁcant at 1% level. Thus, even though a
substantial proportion of the size-wage effect is due to worker heterogeneity, the re-
maining part is still statistically signiﬁcant and practically large. This is not different
from ﬁndings of previous studies (e.g.,Brown and Medoff 1989).
4.3 Main results
We now introduce on-the-job training into the wage equation and allow for different
returns to training in different-sized establishments,
LNWit = TRit + L ESTit + TRLit + X
0
it + "it: (7)
The dummy variable TRit = 1 if worker i has ﬁnished at least one on-the-job training
spell on the current job by year t, TRit = 0 otherwise. TRLit is the interaction term of
TRit with L ESTit. The parameter of primary interest here is , as we want to know
whether returns to training differ for establishments of different size.
The ﬁrst column of Table 4 gives the OLS results. The coefﬁcient on L EST is 14%,
which is close to that in column 1 of Table 3, but now represents the wage difference
between untrained workers in large and small establishments. Return to training is
8.2% in small establishments, while only 3.2% in large establishments. The coefﬁcient
of TRL equals -5% and is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
One could argue that unobserved worker heterogeneity would bias the OLS es-
timates. Suppose that the omitted person effect is positively related to whether a
person is trained or not (TR), and whether a person is employed in a large establish-
ment (L EST), then the OLS estimates of  and  would be upward biased. However,
a priori whether the estimate of  is biased, or if biased, the direction of the bias is
hard to know. To control for unobserved personal heterogeneities, we consider the
following panel model:
LNWit = TRit + L ESTit + TRLit + X
0
it + i + "it; (8)
19where  is the unobserved person effect. The model is estimated using both random
and ﬁxed effects approaches, with results given in columns 2 and 3 in Table 4, re-
spectively. In both cases, the coefﬁcients for large establishment are substantially
smaller than that in OLS. Return to training in small establishments is 5.3% in the
random effect speciﬁcation and 4.6% in the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation, suggesting that
workers are selected for training based on unobservable characteristics. Neverthe-
less, the difference between returns to training for small and large establishments
becomes even larger, with point estimates at -6.6% and -7.5% in random and ﬁxed
effects speciﬁcations, respectively. Both are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
This indicates that return to training is substantially lower in large establishments
even after person effects are taken into account.
The NLSY79 data also contains information regarding the starting and ending
date of each job spell, which allows us to explicitly consider job-match effects that do
not change during a job spell. The model is as follows:
LNWit = TRit + L ESTit + TRLit + X
0
it + i + J(it) + "it; (9)
where  indicates unobserved job-match effect, with J(it) indexing the employer for
person i at year t. The idea is that when a worker and a ﬁrm are a good “match”, the
productivity level would be higher than otherwise. This is in addition to the person
effect captured by .
We estimate the model in two different ways: random effects at the job level and
two-level mixed effects at both the person and job levels.20 We do not consider the
ﬁxed effects approach as variations in establishment size within a job are primarily
due to measurement errors.
Results are reported in the last two columns of Table 4. Again, return to training
is smaller in large establishments by 5% and this difference is statistically signiﬁcant
20This approach is similar to the random effect speciﬁcation, as error terms are still assumed to
be orthogonal to explanatory variables. However, it allows for two levels (person and job spell) of
unobserved effects. The model is estimated using XTMIXED in STATA. For more details, see Searle,
Casella and McCulloch (1992).
20at the 5% level. For the two-level mixed model, return to training is 3.3% in small
establishments. The coefﬁcient on the interaction term of training and establishment
size is -5.3% and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Our preferred speciﬁcation is the ﬁxed effects approach reported in column 3 of
Table 4, which uses only within variations and is consistent even if person effects are
correlated with the explanatory variables. There is strong evidence that return to
training is lower in large establishments than in small ones based on the ﬁxed effects
results. The coefﬁcient on TRL is -7.5% and signiﬁcant at the 1% level with standard
errors corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the person level. One might
worry about the measurement error problem. But in most cases measurement error
would attenuate the coefﬁcient estimate to zero. Overall we ﬁnd strong empirical
support for the theoretical predictions.
Table 5 reports results on probability of receiving training. We have run OLS,
Logit, random effects Logit and ﬁxed effects regressions, using training incidence as
the dummy dependent variable.21 Average marginal effects are reported for Logit
and random effects Logit in Table 5 so that results are all directly comparable. Our
preferred estimate is again the ﬁxed effects estimate, as person effects are allowed to
be correlated with explanatory variables.22 Based on the ﬁxed effects results reported
in column 4 of Table 5, the probability of receiving on-the-job training for workers in
large establishments is about 5% higher than their counterparts in small establish-
ments. The coefﬁcient is also signiﬁcant at the 1% level based on robust standard
errors clustered at the person level. The result is consistent with corrollary 1, which
states that large establishments train a higher proportion of workers.
21We could not perform ﬁxed effect logit estimation, because the maximum likelihood function fail to
converge in STATA.
22In limited dependent variables models, linear probability speciﬁcations still estimate the average
treatment effect correctly without making underlying latent variable assumptions, see discussions in
Section 3.4.2 in Angrist and Pischke (2008).
214.4 Robustness checks
The above empirical test suggests that return to training is smaller in large estab-
lishments than in small ones, with the difference statistically signiﬁcant and quan-
titatively important. Here we consider several robustness checks, and report the
results in Table 6. Basic speciﬁcations are the same as in Table 4.
First, we include off-the-job training information. Although the focus of this pa-
per is on-the-job training, it is useful to check whether adding off-the-job training
information makes any difference. We aggregate all training spells not counted as
on-the-job training into an off-the-job training variable. We also allow tenure effects
to be different in large and small establishments, to capture possible different im-
pacts of informal training not recorded in the data. As the results in panel A of
Table 6 shows, there is no substantive changes about on-the-job training from re-
sults reported before. Based on the preferred ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation (column 2 of
Table 6), the coefﬁcient on the interaction term of on-the-job training and large estab-
lishments is -7.3% and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. Other speciﬁcaitons give similar
results. In addition, wage return to off-the-job training is essentially zero once indi-
vidual heterogeneity is controlled for, and the interaction term of off-the-job training
is not signiﬁcantly different from zero either. The coefﬁcient for large establishment
remains large (7.6% based on the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation) and highly signiﬁcant in
all speciﬁcations even after we control for all possibly differential impacts of formal
and informal training.
Second, we consider the possible impact of measurement error in establishment
size, which might be particularly problematic for ﬁxed effects speciﬁcations. Using
UK data, Manning (2003) ﬁnds substantial measurement error about establishment
size in self-reported employee data. However, as ﬁrst differencing attenuates the
magnitude of all coefﬁcients, the difference in returns to training between small and
large establishments would be even larger if there were no measurement errors.23 In
23Barron, Berger and Black (1997) suggest that measurement errors in training variables are unre-
lated to establishment size.
22panel B of Table 6, we exclude observations with establishment size falling between
475 and 525 and run the same set of regressions. In doing so we avoid using size
variations that are near the 500 cutoff point which is liable to misreporting. Again,
the results are essentially the same as those in Table 4; the coefﬁcient on TRL is
-7.2% and signiﬁcant at the 1% level based on the ﬁxed effects approach.
Next, we restrict the sample to the period of 1987-2000 and use only employer-paid
on-the-job training spells. Training information is collected differently before and af-
ter 1987.24 Also, NLSY79 allows us to identify who paid for on-the-job training in the
1987-2000 surveys. During this period of time, on average, over 90% of all on-the-job
training spells are paid by employers (calculated based on person-year observations),
and large establishments paid a higher percentage of training spells than smaller
ones did. It is plausible that on-the-job training sessions paid and not paid by em-
ployers might have different contents and effects on wages.25 In fact, Holtmann and
Idson (1991) suggest that workers in large ﬁrms are paid more because they are more
likely to receive employer-paid training, which implies that their starting wages are
lower but subsequent wage proﬁles are steeper. Our results as shown in Panel C of
Table 6 suggest that controlling for difference in proportions of employer-paid train-
ing does not change the main ﬁndings.
Lastly, to ensure our results are not driven by inexperienced workers who might
have different levels of attachments to large and small establishments, we use work-
ers with at least 5 years’ labor market experience. Once again, results in panel D of
Table 6 show no substantive changes from the main results. Coefﬁcient on TRL is
-8.2% and signiﬁcant at the 1% level based on the ﬁxed effects approach.
24Despite its richness, training information has not been collected consistently in NLSY79 over time.
The 1979-1986 surveys records only up to three formal training spells enrolled since last interview
and up to two training spells that was still ongoing at last interview. This was followed by a year
of absence of training information in 1987. In the 1988-2002 surveys, up to four current and three
previous training spells are recorded. Supplemental questions, such as who paid for the training and
the usefulness of training programs, were only asked in the latter period.
25It is also likely that some of the on-the-job training spells are misclassiﬁed. Focusing on only
employer-paid on-the-job training thus mitigates possible impacts from misclassiﬁcations.
235 Discussions
In above, we ﬁnd that in industries displaying size-wage premium, workers in large
establishments are more likely to receive on-the-job training, but enjoy lower return
to training. In Appendix B, we conduct falsiﬁcation tests and ﬁnd that those empir-
ical regularities do not hold for industries not displaying size-wage premium. This
suggests that our main empirical ﬁndings cannot be explained by some uncontrolled
factors that may differ by establishment size.26 There is also some evidence that sort-
ing on education and ability (measured by AFQT here) is related to the existence of
size-wage premium (Table 1). Overall, the empirical evidence strongly support our
theoretical predictions.
In light of the empirical evidence reported before, in particular the one on return
to training, we discuss other explanations on size-wage premium. We focus on two
alternative sets of theories, the training hypotheses and the on-the-job search model.
However, we do not discuss explanations that have been rejected in previous studies
such as Brown and Medoff (1989) and Troske (1999).
To start, we consider the ﬁrm-speciﬁc training hypothesis of Troske (1999). Ac-
cording to Troske (1999), large ﬁrms not only hire more skilled workers, but also
“produce” more skilled workers by providing more ﬁrm-speciﬁc training. Hu (2003)
studies the hiring decisions of large ﬁrms and then hypothesizes that ﬁrm-speciﬁc
human capital might explain the size-wage effect. She also notes that it is hard to
test this hypothesis directly, as data on ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital investment and
productivity are typically unavailable. The theoretic underpinning of this argument
is Becker’s original analysis of ﬁrm-speciﬁc training. In Becker’s analysis, workers
and ﬁrms share the costs and beneﬁts of speciﬁc training. If workers in large ﬁrms re-
ceive more training, their starting wages would be lower but subsequent wage growth
would be higher. Thus, workers in large establishments who have not received any
training would be paid the same as their small establishment counterparts, or even
26For example, large establishments may ﬁnd it less costly to provide training to workers, and may
provide more ﬁrm-speciﬁc training.
24lower. Our empirical results, however, show positive size-wage relationship even for
untrained workers.
The general human capital hypothesis of Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001) is sim-
ilar to the speciﬁc training hypothesis and does not imply a size-wage premium for
workers who do not receive any training, which is not supported by the empirical ev-
idence from the NLSY data. Further, it can not explain the ﬁnding of lower return to
training in large establishments either.
Next we consider the productivity hypothesis of Oi and Idson (1999). According to
them, production process in large and small ﬁrms are organized differently, so that
similar workers might have different levels of productivity at different ﬁrms, which
is consistent with the observed size-wage differential. The explanation is different
from a simple selection story that could in principal be tested with control on con-
stant person effects, as productivity differences are endogenous. Although one can
never control for productivity differences perfectly, productivity hypothesis alone can-
not explain why return to training is lower in large establishments. As training and
worker productivity are complements, other things equal, one would expect produc-
tivity gain for workers in large ﬁrms to be bigger. This has been conﬁrmed empirically
by Bishop (1997), who reported that increases in productivity are bigger for workers
who receive training in larger establishments.27 In a competitive setting this would
translate into higher wage increases for trained workers in large establishments, not
the opposite. Thus productivity differences alone cannot be the whole answer for the
size-wage puzzle.
Therefore, the empirical ﬁndings in this paper suggest that one cannot easily ratio-
nalize the existence of size-wage premium using differences in training and other un-
observed and possibly size-dependent worker heterogeneities. One has to go beyond
the perfect competition paradigm and consider labor market imperfections directly.
27The complementarity between training and worker productivity is also demonstrated by the em-
pirical ﬁnding that ﬁrms usually select better workers to receive on-the-job training (Lynch, 1992,
Lillard and Tan, 1992).
25The most prominent “non-neo-classical” theory of size-wage premium is the on-
the-job search model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998). Although both search and our
imperfect information explanations rely on some form of labor market imperfections,
the underlying intuition is quite different. While search explanation suggests that
large ﬁrms pay more in order to attract more workers, our imperfect information
story postulates that large ﬁrms pay more in order to attract better workers. Search
model has not taken account of the correlation of sorting and size-wage premium
across industries. Further, it can not explain the negative size-wage differential.
So far, search models have not provided a direct answer to what would happen
to return to training in different sized ﬁrms or establishments. For example, Quer-
cioli (2005) has extended the Burdett-Mortensen model by allowing ﬁrms to provide
speciﬁc training. But workers in the same ﬁrm receive the same amount of training
in equilibrium. Thus, it is impossible to compare wages for workers with and with-
out training. Overall, it is not obvious that search frictions alone would generate the
empirical ﬁndings reported in this paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper extends the Feng and Zheng (2009) model, which has proposed a new
imperfect information explanation to the size-wage premium puzzle. We incorporate
employer learning and on-the-job training in a two-period setting, and generate two
types of equilibria, one with size-wage premium and the other without. In all equilib-
ria with size-wage premium, there is also positive sorting of worker types with ﬁrm
size. Large employers train a higher proportion of workers but return to training at
large ﬁrms is lower. This is not true in equilibria without size-wage premium.
We then use data from NLSY79 to test predictions of the model. We ﬁnd that
training does not explain the relationship between employer size and wage. The em-
pirical results also show that, for industries that display size-wage premium, workers
in large establishments have a higher probability of receiving on-the-job training but
26lower return to training. Consistent with the theory, these empirical regularities do
not appear in industries that do not display size-wage premium.
Our theory suggests that it is not necessarily large ﬁrms, but ﬁrms that hire bet-
ter workers, that are paying a wage premium. We believe this sheds light on other
forms of wage dispersion, such as inter-industry wage differentials and exporter-wage
premium. Future research should provide more direct empirical evidence on the re-
lationship between sorting and wage premium.
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31Table 1: Preliminary evidence on size-wage premium by industry
Large Estab. Small Estab.
Sample
Industry Large Estab. R2 Size College AFQT College AFQT
A: Industries displaying signiﬁcant positive size-wage premium
Manufacturing 0.144*** (0.021) 0.50 3564 0.35 64 0.18 55
Transport., Commun., 0.107*** (0.042) 0.36 1087 0.33 64 0.11 49
& Other Public Util.
Wholesale Trade 0.258*** (0.059) 0.42 605 0.41 62 0.17 56
Retail Trade 0.084** (0.042) 0.31 2059 0.27 56 0.11 54
Business & Repair 0.124*** (0.047) 0.44 1385 0.44 72 0.18 55
Public Administration 0.128*** (0.049) 0.46 614 0.34 69 0.2 59
B: Industries displaying no signiﬁcant positive size-wage premium
Agriculture, Forestry, -0.108 (0.123) 0.31 559 0.16 54 0.14 47
and Fisheries
Mining 0.104 (0.097) 0.48 164 0.23 59 0.11 38
Construction 0.054 (0.043) 0.24 1938 0.04 43 0.04 41
Finance, Insurance 0.019 (0.056) 0.50 855 0.57 83 0.44 69
and Real Estate
Personal services 0.086 (0.116) 0.37 246 0.12 50 0.15 46
Entertainment and -0.020 (0.113) 0.38 249 0.18 53 0.27 57
Recreation Services
Education Services 0.070 (0.068) 0.32 424 0.72 81 0.52 68
Health Services -0.188*** (0.071) 0.45 447 0.37 66 0.49 72
Other Profess. Service 0.015 (0.075) 0.27 610 0.55 82 0.52 79
Note: Dependent variable is log wage. Other control variables are also included.
S.E. robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the person level. ***, ** and * stand for
signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
32Table 2: Sample Means and Standard Deviations
Large Small
Whole Sample Establishments Establishments
(500+)
Log wage 6.71 (0.52) 6.98 (0.48) 6.65 (0.51)
Education
- Less than 12 years 0.10 0.07 0.11
- 12 years 0.46 0.35 0.48
- 13-15 years 0.25 0.21 0.25
- 16 years 0.16 0.29 0.13
- More than 16 years 0.03 0.08 0.02
AFQT 56 (27.3) 64 (27.8) 54 (26.9)
Local Unemployment Rate 2.6 (0.90) 2.5 (0.79) 2.7 (0.92)
Job Tenure 4.6 (4.6) 5.8 (4.9) 4.4 (4.5)
Labor Market Experience 11.7 (4.7) 12.2 (4.9) 11.6 (4.7)
On-the-job Training (incidence) 0.2 0.36 0.17
Establishment size >= 500 0.17 1 0
Note: Total sample size is 9,314. Standard deviations are given in parentheses for
non-dummy variables.
33Table 3: Wage Regressions Not Controlling for Training
Random Effects, Fixed Effects,
OLS Person level Person Level
LE (500+) 0.133*** 0.072*** 0.054***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.013)
Education
- Less than 12 years -0.072*** -0.063*** NA
(0.024) (0.024)
- 13-15 years 0.141*** 0.135*** NA
(0.022) (0.022)
- 16 years 0.272*** 0.303*** NA
(0.031) (0.031)
- More than 16 years 0.344*** 0.399*** NA
(0.060) (0.058)
AFQT 0.002*** 0.002*** NA
(0.0004) (0.0004)
UNEMP -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.028***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Job Tenure 0.036*** 0.034*** 0.031***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Job Tenure Squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
EXP 0.033*** 0.041*** 0.045***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
EXP Squared -0.0004** -0.0006*** -0.0007***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Note 1: Regressions based on main sample shown in Table 2. Sample size is 9,314.
Note 2: Dependent variable is log wage. Other explanatory variables are
regional dummies, marriage dummies, and industry dummies.
The base group workers are full-time white males with 12 years of schooling,
who work in a small-sized establishment.
Note 3: Standard errors (S.E.) in parentheses adjusted for heteroscedasticity
and clustered at the person level.
***, ** and * stand for statistical signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
LE: large establishment
UNEMP: local unemployment rate
EXP: labor market experience
34Table 4: Wage Regressions Controlling for Training
Random Random Mixed Effects,
OLS Effects, Fixed Effects, Effects, Person and
Person Level Person Level Job Level Job Levels
LE (500+) 0.140*** 0.087*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.068***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
OJT 0.082*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.032*** 0.033***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012)
LE x OJT -0.050* -0.066*** -0.075*** -0.050** -0.053***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
Education
- Less than 12 years -0.069*** -0.062*** NA -0.053*** -0.059**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.018) (0.028)
- 13-15 years 0.137*** 0.133*** NA 0.142*** 0.131***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.016) (0.021)
- 16 years 0.270*** 0.302*** NA 0.327*** 0.316***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.023) (0.028)
- More than 16 years 0.341*** 0.399*** NA 0.432*** 0.422***
(0.061) (0.058) (0.047) (0.052)
AFQT 0.002*** 0.002*** NA 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004)
UNEMP -0.031*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.024***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Job Tenure 0.034*** 0.033*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Job Tenure Squared -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001)
EXP 0.033*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.032*** 0.036***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
EXP Squared -0.0004** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0003* -0.0004***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Note 1 & 2: Same as Note 1 & 2 for Table 3.
Note 3: S.E. for the ﬁrst three columns adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the
person level. S.E. for the fourth column adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at job level.
S. E. for the ﬁfth column (mixed effects results) have been adjusted for heteroscedasticity but not
clustered. ***, ** and * stand for signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
OJT: on-the-job training (incidence).
35Table 5: Probability of Receiving On-the-job Training
Random Effects
OLS Logit Logit, Person Fixed Effects,
Level Person Level
LE (500+) 0.122*** 0.095*** 0.042*** 0.051***
(0.021) (0.015) (0.009) (0.017)
Education
- Less than 12 years -0.048** -0.098** -0.089*** NA
(0.021) (0.038) (0.028)
- 13-15 years 0.053** 0.048** 0.050*** NA
(0.022) (0.020) (0.016)
- 16 years 0.016 0.011 0.024 NA
(0.029) (0.025) (0.021)
- More than 16 years 0.039 0.029 0.037 NA
(0.060) (0.045) (0.037)
AFQT 0.001* 0.001* 0.001** NA
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
UNEMP 0.004 0.001 -0.002 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Job Tenure 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.034***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Job Tenure Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
EXP 0.012*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
EXP Squared -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Note 1: Regressions based on the main sample shown in Table 2. Sample size is 9,685.
Note 2: Dependent variable is incidence of on-the-job training. Other explanatory variables are
dummies for region, marriage and industry. Base group: full-time white males with 12 years
of schooling, work in a small-sized establishment.
Note 3: For OLS, Logit and Fixed Effects results, S.E. adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered
at the person level. Random Effects Logit S.E. not clustered. ***, ** and * stand for signiﬁcance at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Note 4: Results reported for Logit and Random Effects Logit are average marginal effects.
36Table 6: Robustness Checks
Random Random Mixed Effects
OLS Effects, Fixed Effects, Effects, Person and
Person Level Person Level Job Level Job Levels
A: Adding Off-the-job Training and Allowing Tenure Effects to be different
LE 0.123*** 0.084*** 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.074***
(0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.018)
OJT 0.075*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.031** 0.034***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
LE x OJT -0.050 -0.069*** -0.073*** -0.047** -0.054**
(0.031) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.022)
OFT 0.069*** 0.003 -0.014 0.003 -0.005
(0.023) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014)
LE x OFT -0.081** 0.006 0.029 0.025 0.028
(0.036) (0.027) (0.029) (0.024) (0.026)
B: Excluding Those with Establishment Size between 475 and 525
LE 0.133*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.072*** 0.067***
(0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014)
OJT 0.082*** 0.053*** 0.046*** 0.031*** 0.033***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
LE x OJT -0.044 -0.061*** -0.072*** -0.048** -0.050**
(0.030) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022)
C: Restricting to Post-1987 years and employer-paid on-the-job Training
LE 0.142*** 0.089*** 0.075*** 0.072*** 0.070***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013)
OJT 0.079*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
LE x OJT -0.053* -0.073*** -0.083*** -0.052*** -0.057***
(0.029) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.021)
D: Restricting to those with at least 5 years’ labor market experience
LE 0.146*** 0.090*** 0.074*** 0.072*** 0.071***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.014)
OJT 0.081*** 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.031** 0.030**
(0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013)
LE x OJT -0.053* -0.072*** -0.082*** -0.052*** -0.058***
(0.029) (0.021) (0.022) (0.020) (0.021)
Note 1: Regressions based on the main sample (Table 2). Sample sizes vary for each panel.
Panel A includes interaction terms of tenure with size. Other explanatory variables included
are the same as in Table 4.
Note 2 & 3: Same as Note 2 & 3 for Table 4.
OFT: Off-the-job training.
37Appendix A: Proofs of results in Section 3
In order to establish Proposition 1, we follow a backward induction approach, start-
ing from the second period and then going back to the ﬁrst period. In the second
period, incumbent ﬁrms have private evaluations of workers’ performance and up-
date beliefs about their types accordingly. Given the updated belief, they then make
wage offers to current employees and decide whom to train. Having observed workers’
training status and wage offers received from the incumbent ﬁrms, outside ﬁrms can
compete with incumbent ﬁrms for good workers. We begin by analyzing incumbent
ﬁrm’s wage offer and training decision in the second period.
Claim 1. Incumbent ﬁrm makes zero pre-training proﬁt from current employees in the
second period.
Proof. For workers with average pre-training productivity of Hk, incumbent ﬁrm k
can distinguish between two subgroups after observing their performance in the ﬁrst
period. Bayes rule implies that the updated belief for workers it has a good evaluation
is 
g
k = Hk=[Hk + (1   Hk)(1   )], and belief for those it has a bad evaluation is
b
k = Hk(1   )=[Hk(1   ) + (1   Hk)].
Note ﬁrst that ﬁrm k’s average wage offer to their workers in the second period
cannot be lower than Hk. Suppose it is the case, then the ﬁrm would lose all its
workers, as an outside ﬁrm can offer each worker " more, and still be able to make a
proﬁt.
On the other hand, proﬁt maximization implies that ﬁrm k’s average wage offer
will not be higher than Hk. This is because it can always offer 
g
k to those workers with
an evaluation of “g” and offer b
k to those workers with an evaluation of “b”. Doing so
makes its average wage offer equal Hk, while no outside ﬁrms would ﬁnd it proﬁtable
to steal workers from ﬁrm k.
Note that the key to the zero pre-training proﬁt result lies in the strategic ad-
vantage of outside ﬁrms over the incumbent ﬁrm in wage offering process. Outside
ﬁrms know the average productivity of workers at ﬁrm k, and also observe ﬁrm k’s
38wage offers before making their own. This results in zero pre-training proﬁt for the
incumbent ﬁrm even though it has an informational advantage over outside ﬁrms.
Let Nk be the total measure of workers hired by ﬁrm k in the ﬁrst period, including
nk high productivity and mk low productivity workers. We now have the following
claim regarding ﬁrms’ training decisions in the second period.
Claim 2. Firm k provides training to all its employees when training cost
c  c =
(1   )(q   1)nk
(1   )nk + mk
; (A.1)
provides training only to those with a good performance evaluation when
c < c   c =
(q   1)nk
nk + (1   )mk
: (A.2)
It provides no training to employees when c >  c.
Proof. Claim 1 has already showed that ﬁrm k makes zero pre-training proﬁt from its
employees. Hence, the decision on whether to train a worker depends on the marginal
beneﬁt and marginal cost of training alone.
The beneﬁt for ﬁrm k from offering training to workers with evaluation “g” is (q  
1)nk and the cost is [nk + (1   )mk]c. Firm k will provide training to this group of
workers if and only if (q   1)nk  [nk + (1   )mk]c, i.e., c   c  ((q   1)nk)=(nk +
(1   )mk).
Similarly, ﬁrm k will provide training to those with a evaluation “b” if and only if
the beneﬁt from training this group of workers exceed the cost, i.e.,
(1   )nk(q   1)  [(1   )nk + mk]c
This is equivalent to c  c  (1   )nk(q   1)=((1   )nk + mk).
Finally, using 1=2 <  < 1, we have  c  c. The results then follow.
Claim 3. Firm k’s second period total proﬁt (2
k) divided by ﬁrst period measure of
workers (Nk) is weakly increasing in ﬁrst period average productivity (Hk).
39Proof. Based on Claim 1, ﬁrm k’s proﬁt in the second period should equal the surplus
from offering training to workers, as wages on average equal to workers’ pre-training
productivities. Let 2
k be ﬁrm k’s second period total proﬁt, then

2
k = nk(q   1)   Nkc (A.3)




k = (q   1)nk   [nk + (1   )mk]c (A.4)
if c < c   c, which corresponds to the case that ﬁrm only offer training to “g” workers.
In both cases, the average proﬁt function 2
k = k=Nk will be an increasing function of
Hk. To see that, we note that in the ﬁrst case,

2
k = (q   1)Hk   c; (A.5)






= (q   1)Hk   [Hk + (1   )(1   Hk)]c (A.6)
= [(q   1)   c]Hk + (1   )Hkc   (1   )c:
When c >  c, ﬁrm k provides no training and the second period proﬁt is zero.
We now go back to examine ﬁrms’ decisions in the ﬁrst period. The game is essen-
tially the same as analyzed in Feng and Zheng (2009). Let the wage offered by ﬁrm
k be wk, and workers hired by ﬁrm k have average productivity Hk. The measure of
workers ﬁrm k hires equals
Nk = (1   )
k 1 + (1   )
k 1(1   ):
As competition drives down ﬁrms’ total proﬁt from both periods to zero, the wage offer
in the ﬁrst period should equal to the ﬁrst period average productivity plus second
period per worker proﬁt, i.e., wk = Hk + 2
k.
In equilibrium, the number of ﬁrms K is determined by the condition
HK + 
2
K  r > HK+1 + 
2
K+1: (A.7)
40There exists such a ﬁnite K as wk = Hk + 2
k goes to zero in the limit as k increases.
Given ﬁrms’ ﬁrst period decisions, we are now ready to pin down their training
decisions in the second period, using Assumption 1.
Claim 4. Under Assumption 1, ﬁrm 1,2,..., (with  < K) will provide training to the
group of workers with a good performance evaluation (“g”), no ﬁrm provides training
to the group of workers with a bad performance evaluation (“b”).
Proof. We ﬁrst show that under Assumption 1, ﬁrm 1,2,..., (with  < K) will provide
training to those with evaluation “g”. Note that for ﬁrm k,
nk = (1   )
k 1; mk = (1   )
k 1(1   ):
By the condition in (A.2), ﬁrm k would train those with evaluation “g” if and only if
c 
(q   1)nk
nk + (1   )mk
=
(q   1)
 + (1   )(1   )(1   )[=(1   )]k 1:
As long as assumption 1 holds, the above equation will hold for any k  .
To show that no ﬁrm will provide training to those with evaluation “b”, we note
that ﬁrm k will not provide training to these workers if and only if
c >
(1   )nk(q   1)
(1   )nk + mk
=
(1   )(q   1)
(1   ) + (1   )(1   )[=(1   )]k 1:
The quantity on the right hand side is decreasing in k as 1=2 <  < 1. If ﬁrm
1 does not train workers with evaluation “b”, no other ﬁrms will do so. Therefore,
c > (1   )(q   1)=[(1   ) + (1   )(1   )] is sufﬁcient for all ﬁrms not to train
workers with a bad evaluation.
Claim 5. If ﬁrm k provides training to some of its workers, then with average produc-





Hk + (1   Hk)(1   )





Hk(1   ) + (1   Hk)
to those from whom it has a bad performance evaluation.
41Proof. Claim 1 shows that ﬁrm k is indifferent between offering !
g
k to those with a
good evaluation, !b
k to those with a bad evaluation and any other wage schedule with
an average of Hk. However, as outside ﬁrms observe workers’ training status and
wage offers, ﬁrm k can only offer !
g
k to those trained workers (who have received a
good evaluation), and !b
k to those workers that have received a bad evaluation. Should
ﬁrm k offers any wage w0
g < !
g
k to those it intends to train, outside ﬁrms can proﬁtably
offer them w0
g +  to attract them away. Since ﬁrm k can not offer anything less than
!
g
k to those with a “g” evaluation, it will not offer anything more than !b
k to those with
a “b” evaluation.
Note that for a ﬁrm (k > ) that do not offer training to any of its workers, it is
possible that they pay the same wage (which equals average productivity Hk) to all
workers, regardless of the performance evaluations.
Proof of Proposition 1. In equilibrium, workers maximize total wages in both periods,
and ﬁrms maximize proﬁts by making wage offers and training decisions, conditional
on their beliefs about worker type. Neither ﬁrms nor workers has incentives to choose
differently. In addition, each ﬁrm makes zero total proﬁt. In the ﬁrst period, ﬁrm k




(1   )k 1 + (1   )k 1(1   )
and 2
k is weakly increasing in Hk. Therefore, wk decreases in k and different ﬁrms
pay different wages in the ﬁrst period.
Also, since we restrict ﬁrms to hire all workers they label as “h” type (assumption
2), the measure of workers ﬁrm k hires equals
Nk = (1   )
k 1 + (1   )
k 1(1   );
which decreases as k increases. Hence, in the ﬁrst period, larger sized ﬁrms pay
higher wages to workers of the same type than smaller ﬁrms.
In the second period, ﬁrms only provide training to workers with a good perfor-







k, trained workers receive higher wages than un-
trained workers.




k decrease in k. That is, controlling for workers’ training status, larger ﬁrms
still pay higher wages than smaller ﬁrms in the second period.
Proof of Corollary 1. Previously we have shown that Hk is decreasing in k. But the
proportion of trained workers at ﬁrm k equals Hk + (1   )(1   Hk). Since  > 1=2 >
1   , it immediately follows that Hk + (1   )(1   Hk) is decreasing in k as well.
Proof of Corollary 2. Consider two ﬁrms, i and j, with i being the larger ﬁrm while
j being the smaller one. Denote the probability of a worker at ﬁrm i (ﬁrm j) being of
high type as Hi (Hj). Previous result implies that Hi > Hj. Log wage differential is
smaller for trained workers than for untrained workers if and only if:
Hi=[Hi + (1   )(1   Hi)]
Hj=[Hj + (1   )(1   Hj)]
<
(1   )Hi=[(1   )Hi + (1   Hi)]
(1   )Hj=[(1   )Hj + (1   Hj)]
: (A.8)


















As Hi > Hj, Hj=Hi < (1   Hj)=(1   Hi). In addition,  > 1=2 > 1   , Hence, we
have:
(1   )Hj + (1   Hj)
(1   )Hi + (1   Hi)
>
Hj + (1   )(1   Hj)
Hi + (1   )(1   Hi)
:




(1   )Hj + (1   Hj)
(1   )Hi + (1   Hi)

=
(1   )Hi=[(1   )Hi + (1   Hi)]





Hj + (1   )(1   Hj)
Hi + (1   )(1   Hi)

=
Hi=[Hi + (1   )(1   Hi)]
Hj=[Hj + (1   )(1   Hj)]
:
Hence we conclude that log wage differential is smaller for trained workers than for
untrained workers.
43Appendix B: Falsiﬁcation tests
Despite the robustness checks, one can still come up with stories attributing the
lower return to training in large establishments to omitted variables. For example,
if NLSY79 captures less training spells in small establishments than in large ones,
estimated wage return to training in small establishments could be upward biased.28
Therefore, a useful exercise would be to examine industries which show no positive
size-wage effects and are not used in the main analyses. Those industries are listed in
Panel B of Table 1, including agriculture, forestry and ﬁsheries; mining; construction;
ﬁnance, insurance and real estate; personal services; entertainment and recreation
services; education and other professional services. Table A1 presents results for
wage regressions with no control on training, similar to Table 3. The coefﬁcient on
large establishment size is almost zero in the OLS speciﬁcation, but becomes negative
in random effects speciﬁcation. In column 3 of Table A1, the ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation
shows a negative size-wage premium of -6.2% that is signﬁcant at the 5% level. Thus
those industries display very different size-wage relationships, as predicted by our
theory. Coefﬁcient estimates for other variables, such as education, AFQT, tenure,
and labor market experience are similar in magitude to those reported in Table 3.
Table A2 presents the results when on-the-job training information is included.
Note the interaction term of large establishment and on-the-job training is always
positive, although not statistically signiﬁcant in some speciﬁcations. Hence, the result
suggests that for industries with no positive size-wage premium, there is also no
evidence that return to training is lower in large establishments.
Table A3 reports regression results on probability of receiving on-the-job training.
The speciﬁcations are the same as those in Table 5. OLS, Logit, and Random effects
Logit models all suggest that workers in large establishment are more likely to receive
training, but the coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly smaller in magnitude than in Table 5.
Once we control for person effects that are possibly correlated with other explanatory
28Large establishments may provide more formal training, and small establishments provide more
informal training which is not captured in the NLSY data.
44variables with the ﬁxed effects approach (column 4 of Table A3), the probability of
receiving training is the same in large and small establishments. This contrasts with
our results from Table 5. Note that in both results shown in Table 5 and Table A3,
we have not controlled for training cost. Large establishments may enjoy economies
of scale in terms of offering formal training to its employees, but the effect should be
the same for all industries.
45Table A1: Wage Regressions Not Controlling for Training for Industries Not Display-
ing Size-Wage Premium
Random Effects, Fixed Effects,
OLS Person Level Person Level
LE (500+) 0.008 -0.038 -0.062**
(0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
Education
- Less than 12 years -0.036 -0.033 NA
(0.034) (0.033)
- 13-15 years 0.174*** 0.188*** NA
(0.031) (0.032)
- 16 years 0.259*** 0.306*** NA
(0.041) (0.042)
- More than 16 years 0.394*** 0.436*** NA
(0.058) (0.063)
AFQT 0.002*** 0.002*** NA
(0.0006) (0.0005)
UNEMP -0.021** -0.016* -0.014
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Job Tenure 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.022***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Job Tenure Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
EXP 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.047***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
EXP Squared -0.000 -0.0004 -0.0007**
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Note 1: Regressions based on the sample listed in Panel B of Table 1. Sample size is 5,546.
Note 2: Same as Note 2 in Table 3.
Note 3: Same as Note 3 in Table 3.
46Table A2: Wage Regressions Controlling for Training for Industries Not Displaying
Size-Wage Premium
Random Random Mixed Effects,
OLS Effects, Fixed Effects, Effects, Person and
Person Level Person Level Job Level Job Levels
LE (500+) -0.016 -0.045* -0.063** -0.033* - 0.042**
(0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.020) (0.020)
OJT 0.016 0.020 0.018 0.012 0.011
(0.030) (0.025) (0.029) (0.021) (0.023)
LE x OJT 0.087 0.029 0.002 0.078*** 0.061
(0.055) (0.038) (0.040) (0.030) (0.038)
Education
- Less than 12 years -0.036 -0.033 NA -0.049* -0.041
(0.034) (0.033) (0.025) (0.036)
- 13-15 years 0.172*** 0.187*** NA 0.187*** 0.185***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.025) (0.031)
- 16 years 0.261*** 0.306*** NA 0.288*** 0.304***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.033) (0.040)
- More than 16 years 0.392*** 0.435*** NA 0.458*** 0.444***
(0.057) (0.063) (0.049) (0.054)
AFQT 0.002*** 0.002*** NA 0.002*** 0.002***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005)
UNEMP -0.020** -0.016* -0.014 -0.022*** -0.019***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
Job Tenure 0.030*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.027*** 0.025***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Job Tenure Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
EXP 0.024*** 0.039*** 0.046*** 0.027*** 0.033***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.006) (0.006)
EXP Squared 0.00002 -0.0004 -0.0007** -0.0001 -0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Note 1: Regressions based on the sample listed in Panel B of Table 1. Sample size is 5,546.
Note 2: Same as Note 2 in Table 4.
Note 3: Same as Note 3 in Table 4.
47Table A3: Probability of Receiving On-the-job Training for Industries Not Displaying
Size-Wage Premium
Random Effects
OLS Logit Logit, Person Fixed Effects,
Level Person Level
LE (500+) 0.089*** 0.063*** 0.016** 0.009
(0.025) (0.017) (0.008) (0.019)
Education
- Less than 12 years -0.019 -0.060 -0.023 NA
(0.021) (0.042) (0.020)
- 13-15 years 0.037 0.026 0.022 NA
(0.025) (0.023) (0.014)
- 16 years -0.030 -0.028 -0.003 NA
(0.036) (0.031) (0.016)
- More than 16 years 0.032 0.013 0.005 NA
(0.048) (0.036) (0.022)
AFQT 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 NA
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0002)
UNEMP -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 -0.0004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007)
Job Tenure 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.012*** 0.024***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.005)
Job Tenure Squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0004*** -0.001***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0003)
EXP 0.012*** 0.020*** 0.013*** 0.018***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.006)
EXP Squared -0.0003* -0.001** -0.0004*** -0.0006**
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Note 1: Regressions based on the sample shown in Panel B of Table 1. Sample size is 5,879.
Note 2: Same as Note 2 for Table 5.
Note 3: Same as Note 3 for Table 5.
Note 4: Same as Note 4 for Table 5.
48